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SOMEONE ELSE MAY OWN A PIECE OF YOU: LACK OF FEDERAL 
REGULATION OVER DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER DNA TEST KITS 
Alexander (Zan) Eric Newkirk* 
Direct-to-consumer DNA test kits, such as those sold by Ancestry 
and 23andMe, are now more popular than ever. These test kits 
require a consumer to submit a personal DNA sample in exchange 
for detailed results about the consumer’s ancestry. Although about 
half of the United States has a genetic privacy law, they vary in 
strictness and applicability to direct-to-consumer DNA test kits. 
There is currently no federal law regulating the test kit companies’ 
control over the DNA samples they collect, leaving the direct-to-
consumer DNA test kit industry largely self-regulated. The company 
policies which regulate their own control over consumer DNA can 
leave room for interpretation about the limits of such control. This 
lack of clear government oversight, in addition to the inherent value 
of consumer DNA, creates a strong demand for an all-encompassing 
federal law that creates uniform collection, storage, and use of 
genetic information. Analysis of state genetic privacy laws provides 
a building block upon which an effective federal genetic privacy law 
can be constructed. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................268 
II.  ANCESTRYDNA PRIVACY POLICY ........................................272 
A.  Evolution of the Ancestry Privacy Policy .....................272 
B.  Circumstances Under Which a User’s Personal 
Information may be Shared...........................................273 
                                                 
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2020. Thank 
you, NC JOLT editors, for your insightful feedback. I would also like to express 
my gratitude to my family for their constant love and support, and the 
Appalachian State University Department of Chemistry, where I received my 
B.S., for furthering my interest in science and the law. 
268 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 20: 267 
III.  ACTUAL USE OF DTC GENETIC TEST KIT RESULTS BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ...................................................................275 
A. . Parabon’s Success ........................................................276 
B. . Legislative Response to Law Enforcement Use of DTC 
Genetic Test Results ......................................................278 
C.  Law Enforcement Access to Genetic Data Pursuant to the 
Third-Party Doctrine ....................................................279 
IV.  CURRENT REGULATION OF INDIVIDUAL GENETIC 
INFORMATION.....................................................................282 
A.  Genetic Information is Largely Unregulated in the United 
States .............................................................................283 
B.  State Genetic Privacy Laws Vary in Presence and 
Rigidity Across the Country ..........................................286 
1. ... Alaska......................................................................288 
2. ... New Mexico.............................................................291 
3. ... Maryland .................................................................294 
V.  THE VISION: A PROPOSITION TO PREVENT MISUSE OF DNA 
SAMPLES AND GENETIC INFORMATION .............................296 
VI.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................298 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-first century has witnessed an expansion of societal 
interest from safekeeping tangible assets—such as the home, cash, 
and family—to protecting intangible assets as well, such as online 
bank accounts, social media, and even individual genetic identifiers. 
Americans often secure their Facebook profiles with case-sensitive 
passwords that require a number and a symbol to prevent 
unauthorized users from gaining access.1 Most online accounts even 
require that users answer highly intrusive and personal security 
questions as a secondary method of access to the account in the case 
the user in question forgets their login information.2 While Twitter 
                                                 
 1 See How Can I Make My Facebook Password Strong?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/124904560921566?helpref=popular_topics (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
 2 See, e.g., How to Update Your Security Questions & Answers, FIDELITY, 
https://www.fidelity.com/customer-service/how-to-change-your-security-
questions-and-answers (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (“Security questions help 
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and electronic banking sites have ramped up their defenses, 
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing kits with limited data 
security have swept the nation, leaving some test kit users’ personal 
genetic information accessible to others. 
Direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) genetic testing kits are marketed—
often through the internet—directly to the consumer, who sends a 
DNA sample back to the testing kit company for analysis.3 The 
company processes the DNA sample and sends the consumer the 
results, which can include information about a person’s ancestry, 
potential health issues, and more.4 Ancestry (or genealogical) testing 
is considered a form of DTC genetic testing.5 The quality of these 
at-home test kits varies,6 but some of the more well-known brands 
perform an intricate analysis of the consumer’s DNA sample. For 
example, AncestryDNA7 (“Ancestry”) analyzes all 22 pairs of non-
sex chromosomes, providing a broad look at the consumer’s entire 
family tree.8 
The popularity of these DTC genetic testing kits has exploded in 
recent years, and the trend is expected to continue.9 By the end of 
                                                 
Fidelity ensure it’s really you accessing your account.”); The Reason for Security 
Questions, SIRIUSXM, http://siriusxmca.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1
77/~/the-reason-for-security-questions (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (“Your 
personal security questions help us verify your identity when you can’t remember 
your username or password.”). 
 3 See What is Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF 
MED.: GENETICS HOME REF. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov 
/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See id. 
 7 ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 8 ANCESTRYDNA, ANCESTRYDNA 101: THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO DNA 2, 
https://www.ancestrycdn.com/support/us/2016/11/ancestrydna101.pdf. 
 9 See Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Market to Hit $2.5 Bn by 2024: 
Global Market Insights, Inc., PRNEWSWIRE (Dec. 11, 2018, 6:00 AM) 
[hereinafter Global Market Insights], https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/direct-to-consumer-genetic-testing-market-to-hit-2-5-bn-by-2024-
global-market-insights-inc--830436085.html; see also Leah Larkin, DNA Tests, 
DNA GEEK, https://thednageek.com/dna-tests/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) 
(displaying a graph in which less than 2.5 million people were in AncestryDNA’s 
consumer database as of April 2016, whereas approximately 15 million people 
were in the same database in 2019). 
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2017, over twelve million consumers had submitted a DNA sample 
through an at-home genetic testing kit.10 Ancestry, the leading 
genealogy company, processed the DNA of more than seven million 
people in that year.11 The runner-up in the competitive DTC genetic 
testing market, 23andME, analyzed over three million DNA 
samples.12 The concentrated market of DTC genetic testing requires 
heavy promotion to stand out. Ancestry spent approximately $109 
million on television and other ads in the United States in 2016.13 
23andME totaled $21 million on advertisements that same year.14 As 
advertising and technology advance, the DTC genetic testing 
industry is expected to soar in value—with an estimated net worth 
of over $2.5 billion by 2024.15 
Ancestry16 prides itself on providing a comprehensive report of 
a consumer’s recent genetic and ancestral history.17 But sales of 
Ancestry DTC genetic testing kits are driven by many other factors, 
such as the desire to know risks for certain genetic diseases18 and the 
desire to connect with long-lost relatives.19 Even when serious 
                                                 
 10 Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-
was-the-year-consumer-dna-testing-blew-up/. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Global Market Insights, supra note 9. 
 16 As Ancestry dominates the DTC genetic testing market, the scope of this 
article will be narrowed to discuss only Ancestry, not other companies in the same 
industry. 
 17 AncestryDNA – Frequently Asked Questions (United States), 
ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq (last visited Jan. 
19, 2019). 
 18 See, e.g., Global Market Insights, supra note 9 (“Predictive tests enables [sic] 
identification of genetic mutation before actual manifestation resulting in early 
disease diagnosis. Diagnosis of chronic disease such as cancer at an early stage 
can make significant improvements in the lives of cancer patients resulting in 
reduced morbidity, greater probability of surviving and less expensive 
treatment.”). 
 19 See, e.g., John D’Anna, Here’s Five Things You Need to Know Before You 
Take a Home DNA Test, AZCENTRAL (Dec. 23, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-best-reads/2018/12/23/dna-
testing-privacy-what-know-before-home-genealogy-test-ancestry-23-andme-
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motives such as these are involved, the privacy policy is likely an 
afterthought for a consumer.20 But this privacy policy isn’t just any 
other run-of-the-mill privacy policy.21 Ancestry’s privacy policy is 
contracting away consumers’ rights to arguably the most personal 
asset a human has—their genetic information. As of this article’s 
publication, there is no federal law regulating the storage, 
disclosure, and use of this genetic information.22 
The need for a uniform, all-encompassing federal law that 
regulates collection, storage, and use of genetic information is 
urgent. DTC genetic testing kits continue to rise in popularity while 
collecting, storing, and using Americans’ DNA without federal 
limitation. In Section II, this Recent Development covers Ancestry’s 
privacy policy and the limits the company places on itself when 
using consumers’ genetic information. Section III discusses 
governmental use of DTC genetic test results. Section IV reflects on 
the current legal landscape regulating use of genetic information. 
Lastly, Section V describes the features of a viable federal statute 
which would place external limits on DTC genetic testing 
companies’ use of their consumers’ information. 
                                                 
golden-state-killer/2381500002/ (recommending potential DTC genetic testing 
kit users purchase a kit from “the company with the largest number of samples in 
its database, Ancestry,” to find genetic matches with long-lost relatives). 
 20 See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of 
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 543–68 
(2008) (stating privacy policies are “read infrequently,” and estimating Americans 
would spend 67.1 billion hours per year reading privacy policies word-for-word, 
if they were actually read on every website a person encountered). 
 21 See CARLOS JENSEN & COLIN POTTS, PRIVACY POLICIES EXAMINED: FAIR 
WARNING OR FAIR GAME? 1 (2003), ftp://ftp.cc.gatech.edu/pub/gvu/tr/2003/03-
04.pdf (“[Privacy] policies are in many ways modeled after software license 
statements.”). But see Wendy Zamora, What DNA Testing Kit Companies Are 
Really Doing with Your Data, MALWAREBYTES LABS (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2018/11/dna-testing-kit-companies-really-
data/ (describing the development of privacy policies for DNA testing companies 
as “pioneering work”). 
 22 See Genetic Information Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/genetic-information-privacy (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019) (addressing the fact HIPAA only regulates “covered entities,” and pointing 
out that Ancestry is one of many non-covered entities which collects genetic 
information). 
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II.  ANCESTRYDNA PRIVACY POLICY 
At nine pages long, Ancestry’s privacy policy is surprisingly 
brief, considering the profound privacy interest involved in genetic 
testing.23 The most recent update to the Ancestry privacy policy 
emphasizes transparency, simplicity, and control of the data by the 
consumer.24 The policy is prefaced with a few statements of 
reassurance to address potential concerns of Ancestry consumers, 
including: the fact that consumers may make unexpected discoveries 
(i.e. discovering your mother is not your genetic relative, thus not 
your actual mother); the ability to manage and delete DNA and DNA 
data as described in the privacy policy; and a reminder to remain 
confident in Ancestry’s use of consumers’ data.25 This last statement 
raises the question as to why would someone be worried about how 
their personal data is being used. 
A.  Evolution of the Ancestry Privacy Policy 
Ancestry began selling DTC genetic test kits in 2002, sixteen 
years after the introduction of its website;26 hence, its privacy policy 
was not originally prepared to dictate how consumer DNA data was 
managed or disclosed. The current privacy policy is a part of a 
constantly evolving agreement that has been shaped in part by public 
criticism.27 In the October 14, 2016 update to the Ancestry privacy 
policy, the company stated, “we cannot guarantee and we do not 
warrant that loss, misuse, or alteration of data will not occur, and we 
are not responsible for the theft, destruction, or inadvertent 
disclosure of your information.”28 In May 2017, a consumer 
                                                 
 23 See Zamora, supra note 21 (mentioning a comprehensive DNA testing 
company privacy policy that is twenty-one pages long). For the full text of the 
Ancestry privacy policy, see Your Privacy, ANCESTRYDNA, 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 24 See Your Privacy, supra note 23. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See Our Story, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-
ancestry/our-story (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 27 See Eric Heath, Setting the Record Straight: Ancestry and Your DNA, 
ANCESTRYDNA (May 21, 2017), https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/ 
2017/05/21/setting-the-record-straight-ancestry-and-your-dna/. 
 28 Ancestry Privacy Statement, ANCESTRYDNA (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement 
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protection litigator in New Jersey claimed that Ancestry’s privacy 
policy and terms of service awarded the company an ownership 
interest in the consumers’ DNA sample in perpetuity, while the 
consumers’ ownership was measured only in years.29 Immediately 
after publication of the New Jersey attorney’s statement, Eric Heath, 
Chief Privacy Officer of Ancestry, addressed those claims in a blog 
post, which included a link to the updated Ancestry terms and 
conditions.30 Heath ended his address to the public stating 
“[Ancestry has] language throughout the process of activating a test 
that clarifies and limits what [Ancestry] can and can’t do with [the 
consumer’s] data” because consumer genomics “is still a new 
industry.”31 There is no clarification in the blog post about what 
“test” Heath references or how the “test” sets limits on consumer 
data disclosure. The public response by one of Ancestry’s top 
personnel demonstrates that Ancestry, and not some external 
force—such as federal government, restricts the level of ownership 
by the consumer and the company in the consumer’s DNA sample. 
Ancestry also sets forth in its privacy policy when a consumer’s 
personal information, including genetic data, may be shared with 
another person.32 These circumstances are discussed in-depth below. 
B.  Circumstances Under Which a User’s Personal 
Information may be Shared 
Although some consumers may believe that the submission of 
their DNA was just a quick “in-and-out” experiment, the DNA 
sample can remain in possession of Ancestry indefinitely.33 After the 
DNA sample has been processed, the DNA and saliva are de-
identified (removed of the individual’s name and other identifying 
markers) and stored in an encrypted database for consumer 
                                                 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171205204523/https://www.ancestry.com/cs/leg
al/privacystatement]. 
 29 See Joel Winston, Ancestry.com Takes DNA Ownership Rights from 
Customers and Their Relatives, THINKPROGRESS (May 17, 2017, 7:54 PM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/ancestry-com-takes-dna-ownership-rights-from-
customers-and-their-relatives-dbafeed02b9e/. 
 30 See Heath, supra note 27. 
 31 See id. 
 32 See Your Privacy, supra note 23. 
 33 See id. 
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protection.34 The samples and information are stored so that they are 
available for “future testing.”35 This future testing is only performed 
if a customer gives informed consent for further research.36 The 
research is executed in collaboration with third-party researchers for 
the purpose of better understanding “population history, human 
migration and improv[ing] human health.”37 The third-party 
researchers include, but are not limited to, academic institutions, 
non-profits, for-profit businesses, and government agencies.38 Some 
of these institutions even provide compensation to Ancestry for the 
right to access consumer DNA.39 
Personal information may also be shared when a consumer 
chooses to share private details with other Ancestry members.40 This 
is usually done in order to connect with a “DNA match” who may 
be a potential relative and to allow members to trade stories about 
their ancestors and/or personal lives.41 Personal information may be 
shared with other service providers whom Ancestry depends on to 
complete the transaction with the consumer, or if Ancestry is bought 
out by another company.42 Service providers of Ancestry generally 
include laboratory partners, shipping providers, and sample storage 
facilities.43 The service providers and any potential acquiring 
company are also subject to the same privacy policy.44 Personal 
information can be shared when Ancestry publishes aggregated 
data, such as “noting the percentage of immigrants in a state that are 
                                                 
 34 See id. But see Cassie Martin, Privacy and Consumer Genetic Testing Don’t 
Always Mix, SCIENCENEWS (June 5, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/science-public/privacy-and-consumer-
genetic-testing-dont-always-mix (warning that some scientists believe encrypted 
genetic information may be hacked and decrypted with the use of other publicly-
available information). 
 35 See Your Privacy, supra note 23. 
 36 See id. 
 37 AncestryDNA Informed Consent, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry 
.com/dna/lp/informedconsent-v4-en (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See Your Privacy, supra note 23. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. 
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from a particular geographic region or country”.45 Ancestry follows 
this statement with a disclaimer that the aggregated data does not 
provide individual personal information.46 
Lastly, personal data can be shared when Ancestry believes “it 
is reasonably necessary to: comply with valid legal process (e.g. 
subpoenas, warrants); enforce or apply the Ancestry Terms and 
Conditions; protect the security or integrity of the Services; or 
protect the rights, property, or safety, or Ancestry, our employees or 
users.”47 The most available data about any of these circumstantial 
uses relates to law enforcement requests for user information.48 
Ancestry releases an annual transparency report on how many 
requests they receive for personal information from law 
enforcement.49 In 2017, Ancestry reported granting thirty-one of 
thirty-four valid requests for information, all of which pertained to 
investigations involving credit card misuse and identity theft.50 
III.  ACTUAL USE OF DTC GENETIC TEST KIT RESULTS BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT  
In recent news, DTC genetic test kit results have reportedly been 
used to help solve murder cold cases and identify dead bodies.51 One 
of the primary detective agencies is Parabon NanoLabs (“Parabon”). 
Parabon does not obtain the genetic data used in solving these cases 
directly from a DTC genetic test kit company.52 Rather, Parabon 
uses the services of GEDmatch, a database of DTC genetic test 
results voluntarily submitted by users.53 
                                                 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See Ancestry 2018 Transparency Report, ANCESTRYDNA, 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See, e.g., Kate Snow & Jon Schuppe, ‘This is Just the Beginning’: Using DNA 
and Genealogy to Crack Years-Old Cold Cases, NBC NEWS (July 18, 2018, 4:30 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/just-beginning-using-dna-
genealogy-crack-years-old-cold-cases-n892126. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. 
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A. Parabon’s Success 
Parabon has worked with police departments across the nation 
to make arrests in numerous cold cases and identify deceased 
individuals.54 The company advertises this assistance as “Snapshot 
Genetic Genealogy Service,” which “combines new DNA testing 
methods with genetic and traditional genealogical research to 
uncover the likely identity of a perpetrator or identify human 
remains.”55 The Snapshot service was so effective and widely-
desired that it closed more than one cold case every two weeks 
across the United States in its first 100 days of business.56 Parabon’s 
Chief Genealogist, Cece Moore, describes the Snapshot process as 
follows: 
[O]nce [Moore] gets a DNA profile from Parabon, [Moore] uploads it 
into GEDmatch and compiles a list of relatives, narrowing it down to a 
second or third-cousin, or closer. [Moore] builds the family tree 
backward to common ancestors—usually the great- or great-great 
grandparents. Then [Moore] turns forward in time, filling out more 
branches and narrowing down her search using publicly available data, 
including obituaries, wedding announcements and social media. [Moore] 
compiles a list of people who fit the profile of a possible suspect and 
gives it to police, who take it from there.57 
This explanation makes clear that a consumer’s DTC genetic test 
kit results can reveal valuable information about the consumer’s 
relatives, who may not have consented to the public display of such 
material. This caused concern for Curtis Rogers, the founder of 
GEDmatch, and led him to quickly revise his company’s privacy 
policy to inform patrons they were free to remove their 
information.58 Despite this warning, many declined to remove their 
GEDmatch profile, and the site continues to add approximately 
1,500 new profiles a day.59 
                                                 
 54 See id. 
 55 Parabon® Announces 10th Solved Case in First 100 Days of Snapshot® 
Genetic Genealogy Service, PARABON NANOLABS (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://parabon-nanolabs.com/news-events/2018/09/snapshot-genetic-
genealogy-10-solves-in-first-100-days.html. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Snow & Schuppe, supra note 51. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. 
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A closer look at the revised GEDmatch privacy policy describes 
a number of ways a patron of GEDmatch can upload “raw” DNA 
data to the website. Aside from being allowed to upload one’s own 
DNA, GEDmatch allows patrons to upload the: 
DNA of a person who has granted [a patron] specific authorization to 
upload their DNA to GEDmatch; DNA of a person known by [a patron] 
to be deceased; and DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement 
to either: (1) identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another 
individual; or (2) identify remains of a deceased individual[.]60 
The privacy policy defines “violent crime” as homicide or sexual 
assault, but there is no description of what qualifies as “specific 
authorization.”61 A few lines down, the privacy policy states 
“GEDmatch will not be responsible for any raw data provided to 
GEDmatch in violation of this Policy.”62 This statement is an attempt 
to remove all liability from the entity that originally made it possible 
to freely share genetic code among the public. The privacy policy 
seems to discourage misuse of another person’s DTC genetic test 
results, but the policy does not specify how tightly the company 
regulates or enforces it.63 
For example, the policy does not describe the process for 
confirming that certain DNA was authorized for upload, from a dead 
individual, or “obtained and authorized by law enforcement” prior 
to upload on GEDmatch.64 Nor is there a description of the process 
for confirming that DNA is being used to “identify a perpetrator of 
a violent crime” or “identify the remains of a deceased individual.”65 
This sheds light on a vulnerability many may not have expected. 
Without a clear definition of “specific authorization,” there is an 
opportunity for practically anybody who has access to another’s 
DTC genetic test results to upload them on GEDmatch for the world 
to see. These results could be available to law enforcement, 
insurance providers, and others who have reason to discriminate 
                                                 
 60 GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated May 20, 2018). 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. 
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against an individual on the basis of their genetic makeup. The 
policy even states that “future genealogical and non-genealogical 
uses [of genetic data] may be developed, including uses that 
GEDmatch cannot predict or foresee[,]”66 indicating the company 
hosting these services has no idea how much potential there is for 
misuse of genetic data. In the absence of any federal law, the only 
entity capable of preventing potential misuse, the DTC company, 
has already attempted to remove all liability via its privacy policy. 
Yet, if companies such as GEDmatch are not held accountable in 
protecting personal genetic data displayed on their website, then 
who will? 
B. Legislative Response to Law Enforcement Use of DTC 
Genetic Test Results 
Some state officials have already taken steps toward holding 
genealogy databases accountable for any potential misuse of 
personal genetic data. A Maryland legislator, Charles Sydnor, is 
advocating for the protection of the public’s genetic data from law 
enforcement.67 Sydnor believes use of the genealogy databases is an 
overreach and even a violation of the United States Constitution.68 
Sydnor introduced a bill that would ban law enforcement use of 
genetic data accessible on genealogy sites, because he believes that 
just because one person may want to perform a DTC genetic test 
should not mean that person’s extended family is also subject to a 
search by the state.69 However, Maryland law enforcement is heavily 
opposed to the bill and references the successful identification of 
violent criminals that would not have been possible without police 
access to genealogy sites.70 
Although this Maryland bill is not guaranteed to fully protect the 
public’s genetic data from misuse, or guaranteed to even become 
                                                 
 66 Id. 
 67 Lindsay Watts, Maryland Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Ban Police Use of DNA 
Databases, FOX 5 DC (Feb. 11, 2019, 10:22 PM), https://www.fox5dc.com 
/news/local-news/maryland-lawmaker-proposes-bill-to-ban-police-use-of-dna-
databases. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. 
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law, it is an attempt to further balance the Fourth Amendment rights 
of DTC genetic test kit consumers with the urgency of some law 
enforcement investigations.71 In urgent situations, such as a 
homicide or discovery of a dead body, law enforcement will likely 
want to use all tools available to its investigation. So why shouldn’t 
law enforcement be able to use a DTC genetic test kit consumer’s 
genetic data that was voluntarily posted to a public genealogy site? 
C.  Law Enforcement Access to Genetic Data Pursuant to the 
Third-Party Doctrine 
Public genealogy information that was voluntarily submitted 
may be accessible by law enforcement pursuant to the third-party 
doctrine. The third-party doctrine “stems from the notion that an 
individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information 
knowingly shared with another.”72 An individual who shares 
information with a third party cannot expect the third party to refrain 
from divulging the information to others, including the 
government.73 This allows law enforcement to use information that 
has been knowingly shared with others.74 The doctrine originates 
from two 1970s Supreme Court cases, Smith v. Maryland and United 
States v. Miller, and has been most recently re-shaped by Carpenter 
v. United States.75 
In Smith, the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that law 
enforcement’s use of a pen register constituted a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment because the pen register only kept record of 
                                                 
 71 See id. (quoting Charles Sydnor, who said, “I may want to perform a DNA 
search on Ancestry.com, but I don’t think that should subject my children and 
their children and their children’s children to a state search.”). 
 72 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
 73 See id. at 2216. 
 74 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (holding it constitutional for law 
enforcement to access up to six days’-worth of cell-site records to track the 
defendant’s location over time); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding 
law enforcement’s use of a pen register to identify the phone number defendant 
dialed constitutional); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding bank 
notes voluntarily handed over to the bank by the defendant admissible against the 
defendant). 
 75 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
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what number was being dialed.76 The dialed numbers were also 
given to the telephone company upon making a call.77 Since the 
defendant voluntarily informed the telephone company of the 
numbers he dialed, the defendant no longer had an expectation of 
privacy as to which numbers he dialed.78 
In Miller, the Court found no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the defendant’s financial statements which were subpoenaed by 
law enforcement.79 The financial statements contained only 
information which was routinely exposed to employees of the 
bank.80 Once the defendant handed this information over to the bank, 
the defendant assumed the risk that this information could be 
conveyed to the government.81 
The Court in Carpenter delved deeper into the third-party 
doctrine to address the fact that technology has advanced far beyond 
pen registers and bank statements, in turn making a much greater 
wealth of information available to law enforcement.82 In this case, 
the Court found that law enforcement’s use of cell-site records to 
track defendant’s location was a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.83 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
frequently analogized to the situations at hand in Smith and Miller.84 
Eventually, the Court drew the following distinction: 
[T]he fact of diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth 
Amendment falls out of the picture entirely. Smith and Miller, after all, 
did not rely solely on the act of sharing. Instead, they considered the 
                                                 
 76 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 743–44. 
 79 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. at 443. 
 82 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (“As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous 
dissent, the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of 
invading privacy have become available to the Government’—to ensure that the 
‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections. [citation 
omitted]. Here the progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful 
new tool to carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time, this tool 
risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers, ‘after consulting the 
lessons of history,’ drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”). 
 83 Id. at 2220. 
 84 See generally id. 
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nature of the particular documents sought to determine whether there is 
a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning their 
contents. Smith pointed out the limited capabilities of a pen register; . . . 
telephone call logs reveal little in the way of identifying information. 
Miller likewise noted that checks were not confidential communications 
but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.85 
The Court found the “unique nature of cell phone location 
information” and the lack of “any affirmative act on the part of the 
user beyond powering up [the cell phone]” involved privacy issues 
far greater than those in Smith and Miller.86 Although this ruling was 
a step back from strict adherence to the third-party doctrine, the 
doctrine remains good law.87 The Court was careful not to 
extrapolate the findings in Carpenter to future cases which may also 
present an issue with the third-party doctrine, in fear of 
“embarrass[ing] the future.”88 In response to Justice Gorsuch’s 
suggestion that the Court address what constitutes a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in similar situations, the majority responded 
with “we ‘do not begin to claim all the answers today,’ and therefore 
decide no more than the case before us.”89 
In light of this narrow ruling, uncertainty lies ahead for 
consumers of Ancestry’s DTC genetic test kits. With the third-party 
doctrine still intact, Carpenter leaves unclear whether there is any 
legitimate expectation of privacy in voluntarily-posted genetic data 
that could provide Fourth Amendment protections from government 
intrusion. The Court may be waiting for an opportunity to “tread 
carefully” on the issue once it has all of the relevant facts pertaining 
to DTC genetic test kits.  
If the Court were to grant certiorari to such a case, it would likely 
analogize the facts of the case to precedent in the same manner as it 
did in Carpenter. Genetic data does not have much in common with 
the “limited capabilities” of a pen register employed in Smith, nor is 
it comparable to the “negotiable instruments” used in Miller. 
                                                 
 85 Id. at 2219 (internal citations omitted). 
 86 Id. at 2220. 
 87 See id. (“[W]e do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller.”). 
 88 Id. at 2220 (“As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations 
in airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that 
we do not ‘embarrass the future.’”). 
 89 Id. at 2220 n.4 (citation omitted). 
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However, the cell-site records used to track the defendant in 
Carpenter share a bit more in common with genetic data. Whereas 
the cell-site records are able to locate where an individual is, or has 
been, genetic data is able to pinpoint the geographical origins of an 
individual. Since genetic data can be used for much more than 
simply identifying a person’s ancestry, one could reason that genetic 
information is of an even more “unique nature” than cell-site 
records, thus Fourth Amendment protections should extend to 
consumers of DNA genetic test kits. In addition, the lack of any 
“affirmative act” beyond “powering up” the cell phone could be 
paralleled to the lack of any affirmative act beyond a consumer 
“activating” their test kit by submitting their DNA sample. 
Following the above reasoning, the Court would presumably 
rule government access to genetic data on a public domain a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the 
third-party doctrine would not excuse law enforcement’s 
unauthorized access of genetic data in the public domain. 
Nonetheless, this is all speculation into a future scenario in which 
the Court is presented with a case of genetic data misuse. For the 
time being, these issues belong solely to the legislature for 
resolution. 
IV.  CURRENT REGULATION OF INDIVIDUAL GENETIC 
INFORMATION 
As technology advances and new genealogical innovations are 
unveiled, the law must follow suit to address whether any 
restrictions should be set on the use or possession of such 
technology. This section reveals the flaws in current genetic data 
protection legislation and focuses on the potential for misuse of this 
data that could not have possibly been foreseen by legislators 
enacting these laws. Furthermore, the absence of a federal law which 
tightly polices the actions of companies in the DTC genetic test kit 
industry creates an unregulated field of uncertainty. Fortunately, 
some of the states have established laws that place limits on what 
DTC genetic test kit companies can do with a person’s genetic data. 
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A.  Genetic Information is Largely Unregulated in the United 
States 
As of this Recent Development’s publication, there remains no 
uniform, all-encompassing federal law which regulates the 
collection, storage, or use of genetic data by private or government 
organizations.90 States without their own genetic information 
privacy laws leave their citizens’ genetic data protected only by 
outdated federal privacy laws, whose drafters could not have 
foreseen the normalized and voluntary collection of individuals’ 
DNA.91 If state or federal laws such as the Privacy Act of 1974 (“the 
Privacy Act”), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974 (“FERPA”), the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) do not protect the citizens’ 
genetic data, then all discretion lies with the private or government 
organization in deciding how to collect, store, or use that 
information.92 Most of these regulations were intended for a purpose 
other than protecting citizens from their own voluntarily-submitted 
DNA from being used against them. For this reason, those laws 
would not directly apply to companies that handle DTC test kit 
results nor would the laws govern others’ use of the genetic data. 
The Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted to prohibit disclosure of 
records with personal identifiers (such as social security number, 
name, or birthday) without written consent of the individual to 
whom the records relate.93 This statute only restricts the actions of 
federal agencies and covers only the records controlled by those 
                                                 
 90 See Genetic Information Privacy, supra note 22. 
 91 See Danny Thakkar, Biometric Regulations in the U.S. States: The State of 
Play, BAYOMETRIC, https://www.bayometric.com/biometric-regulations-us-
states/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 92 See id.; see also Genetic Information Privacy, supra note 22. 
 93 See Freedom of Info. Act Div., The Privacy Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/foia/privacy/ index.html; see 
also 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012) (“Conditions of disclosure. -- No agency shall 
disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of 
communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written 
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record 
pertains . . . .”). 
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agencies.94 The largest DTC genetic test kit manufacturer, Ancestry, 
cannot fall within the scope of the Privacy Act as the company is 
privately-owned.95 
FERPA was also enacted in 197496 to protect the educational 
records of American students.97 FERPA applies to any educational 
institution that receives funding from the United States Department 
of Education.98 Since Ancestry is not an educational institution and 
does not report receiving any funds from the Department of 
Education, it is unlikely Ancestry is within the scope of FERPA’s 
regulation. 
HIPAA was enacted by the United States’ government on 
August 21, 1996, for the purpose of setting a national standard for 
the protection of certain health information.99 The regulation 
                                                 
 94 See Freedom of Info. Act Div., supra note 93; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a 
(defining “agency” as an entity that meets 12 requirements, the first of which is 
maintaining records required by statute or executive order). 
 95 See Company Facts, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/ 
about-ancestry/company-facts (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
 96 Legislative History of Major FERPA Provisions, U.S. DEP’T ED. (last 
modified Feb. 11, 2004), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/leg-
history.html; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“No funds shall be 
made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or 
institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the 
parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency 
or at such institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and review the 
education records of their children.”); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513(b)(1), 88 Stat. 484 (1974). 
 97 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. DEP’T ED. (last 
modified Mar. 1, 2018), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/ 
index.html?src=rn. 
 98 See id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3) (2012) (“For the purposes of this 
section the term ‘educational agency or institution’ means any public or private 
agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable 
program.”). 
 99 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2013); see also Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) 
(“An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability and 
continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to 
combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to 
promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care 
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protects “health information,” which includes genetic 
information,100 from disclosure by organizations referred to as 
“covered entities.”101 A “covered entity” is defined as “(1) A health 
plan[;] (2) A health care clearinghouse[; or] (3) A health care 
provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in 
connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter.”102 None 
of these definitions would classify Ancestry, or any other DTC 
genetic test kit manufacturer, as a “covered entity.” In certain 
situations, HIPAA may also apply to a “business associate.”103 But 
DTC genetic testing companies would not classify as a “business 
associate” under the Act’s definition so long as the company were 
not working in adjunct with a covered entity.104 Ancestry states in its 
                                                 
services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for 
other purposes.”). 
 100 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
HIPAA ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION 14 (2013); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-
9(a) (2012). 
 101 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 99; see also § 1320d-1(a). 
 102 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 100, at 11; see also § 1320d-1(a). 
 103 Id. at 11. Section 160.102 of the Act, titled “Applicability” states:  
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the standards, requirements, and 
implementation specifications adopted under this subchapter apply to the 
following entities:  
(1) A health plan.  
(2) A health care clearinghouse.  
(3) A health care provider who transmits any health information in 
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this 
subchapter.  
(b) Where provided, the standards, requirements, and implementation 
specifications adopted under this subchapter apply to a business 
associate. 
 104 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 100, at 11. Section 160.103 of this 
Act, titled “Definitions,” states:  
(3) Business associate includes:  
(i) A Health Information Organization, E-prescribing Gateway, or other 
person that provides data transmission services with respect to protected 
health information to a covered entity and that requires access on a 
routine basis to such protected health information.  
(ii) A person that offers a personal health record to one or more 
individuals on behalf of a covered entity.  
(iii) A subcontractor that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits 
protected health information on behalf of the business associate. 
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privacy policy that it does not share genetic information with 
“insurance companies, employers, or third-party marketers without 
[the consumer’s] express consent”105—meaning Ancestry does not 
work in adjunct with covered entities without the consumer’s 
affirmative consent. Thus, HIPAA does not apply to Ancestry and 
does not provide any sort of genetic privacy to its consumers. 
GINA was enacted on May 21, 2008, to protect citizens from 
having their genetic information used to discriminate against them 
in health coverage and employment situations.106 As stated in the 
previous paragraph, Ancestry does not share genetic information 
with either insurance companies or employers without the 
consumer’s informed consent. Consequently, without the informed 
consent of a consumer, Ancestry does not fall within the scope of 
GINA. With the exception of GINA, all of these federal laws were 
enacted before Ancestry began selling DTC genetic test kits.107 
Therefore, lawmakers could not have possibly anticipated the 
potential for misuse of large amounts of personal genetic data found 
in databases as large as Ancestry’s. The only federal law of interest 
enacted after the sale of DTC genetic test kits is GINA, but this law 
was implemented long before the massive surge in popularity of 
these test kits.108 GINA also only focuses on the potential for 
discrimination by an employer or insurer with a person’s genetic 
data, rather than regulating the broader issue of potential for general 
misuse of personal genetic data. This leaves state legislatures to deal 
with the issue of implementing laws aimed at preventing general 
misuse of results from DTC genetic test kits. 
B.  State Genetic Privacy Laws Vary in Presence and Rigidity 
Across the Country 
As of the publication of this Recent Development, only twenty-
six states have passed statutes regulating the disclosure of genetic 
                                                 
 105 Ancestry Privacy Statement, supra note 28. 
 106 See Genetic Information, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 16, 
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/genetic-
information/index.html; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2012). 
 107 See Our Story, supra note26 26 (establishing that Ancestry began selling 
DTC genetic testing kits in 2002). 
 108 See Global Market Insights, supra note 9. 
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information.109 These state laws vary widely in the limits placed 
upon disclosure and use of other persons’ genetic information.110 
There is controversy between commentators as to whether genetic 
information should be treated the same as other health 
information.111 Some commentators agree that it should be regulated 
in the same manner as non-genetic information, while others argue 
that genetic information requires special legal protection due to its 
unique properties—an approach called “genetic exceptionalism.”112 
This disagreement among commentators is reflected in the content 
of the genetic privacy statutes of states across the country. 
Some state statutes are narrowly-tailored, similar to federal laws 
such as GINA, and only prevent disclosure of genetic information 
in instances where it would affect insurance or employment of an 
individual.113 Meanwhile, other states have sweeping policies of 
genetic information use that require formal and written consent of 
the individual and restricts law enforcement from obtaining a 
person’s genetic information without that individual’s consent.114 
Only five state statutes define a person’s genetic information as their 
                                                 
 109 State Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://pierce.wesleyancollege.edu/faculty/hboettger-tong/docs/hbt%20public% 
20folder/FYS/State%20Genetic%20Summary%20Table%20on%20Privacy%20
Laws.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. For a further description of genetic exceptionalism, see AMANDA K. 
SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34376, GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM: 
GENETIC INFORMATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (2011) (“[Genetic exceptionalism] 
is based on the supposition that genetic information itself embodies several 
characteristics that may make it special and differentiate it from other medical or 
even personal information. According to the perspective of genetic 
exceptionalism, the characteristics of genetic information that make it different 
include the following: (1) it can be predictive of future disease; (2) it is a unique 
identifier; (3) it can reveal information about family members; (4) it is vertically 
transmitted (passed from parent to child); (5) it can impact communities; (6) it can 
be used to discriminate and stigmatize; and (7) it can cause serious psychological 
harm.”). 
 113 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (West 2019). 
 114 See, e.g., HEALTH, SAFETY, AND HOUSING—GENETIC PRIVACY, ALASKA 
STAT. ANN. § 18.13.010 (West 2019). 
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own personal property.115 Alaska is the sole state to define a person’s 
DNA sample as their own personal property.116 The following 
analysis will provide a comparison between three different state 
statutes (Alaska, New Mexico, and Maryland) concerning genetic 
information privacy. 
1. Alaska 
In 2004, the legislature of Alaska enacted a law regulating 
genetic privacy.117 This act is all-encompassing, setting forth an 
individual’s right to their own DNA and how it is collected, stored, 
or used.118 The Act requires written consent of an individual, or their 
                                                 
 115 State Genetic Privacy Laws, supra note 109. The five states include Alaska, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See § 18.13.010. This section, titled “Genetic testing” states:  
Sec. 18.13.010. Genetic testing. 
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, 
(1) a person may not collect a DNA sample from a person, perform a 
DNA analysis on a sample, retain a DNA sample or the results of a DNA 
analysis, or disclose the results of a DNA analysis unless the person has 
first obtained the informed and written consent of the person, or the 
person’s legal guardian or authorized representative, for the collection, 
analysis, retention, or disclosure; 
(2) a DNA sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the 
sample are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed. 
(b) The prohibitions of (a) of this section do not apply to DNA samples 
collected and analyses conducted 
(1) under AS 44.41.035 or comparable provisions of another jurisdiction; 
(2) for a law enforcement purpose, including the identification of 
perpetrators and the investigation of crimes and the identification of 
missing or unidentified persons or deceased individuals; 
(3) for determining paternity; 
(4) to screen newborns as required by state or federal law; 
(5) for the purpose of emergency medical treatment. 
(c) A general authorization for the release of medical records or medical 
information may not be construed as the informed and written consent 
required by this section. The Department of Health and Social Services 
may by regulation adopt a uniform informed and written consent form to 
assist persons in meeting the requirements of this section. A person using 
that uniform informed and written consent is exempt from civil or 
criminal liability for actions taken under the consent form. A person may 
revoke or amend their informed and written consent at any time.  
 118 See id. 
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legal guardian, in order for their genetic data to be collected, 
analyzed, retained, or disclosed.119 The statute further states “a DNA 
sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample 
are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.”120 
This statute also sets forth penalties for any violation in the 
collection, storage, or use of an individual’s genetic information.121 
Anyone who violates the rules set forth in this law could be liable 
for up to $5,000 in damages to any person who suffered harm, and 
liable for up to $100,000 in damages to any person who suffered 
harm if the violation “resulted in profit or monetary gain to the 
violator.”122 A violator of this law could also be charged with the 
crime of “unlawful DNA collection, analysis, retention, or 
disclosure,” which is a class A misdemeanor.123 A person found 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor could face up to one year in jail and 
a fine of $10,000.124 
The only foreseeably-desired safeguard that is not granted to 
Alaskan citizens by this genetic privacy statute is protection from 
unauthorized use of an individual’s genetic information by law 
enforcement. The prohibitions of the Alaskan statute do not apply to 
“DNA samples collected . . . for a law enforcement purpose, 
including the identification of perpetrators and the investigation of 
crimes and the identification of missing or unidentified persons or 
deceased individuals.”125 The statute does not include any statement 
of legislative intent describing why the law expressly excludes DNA 
samples collected for a law enforcement purpose. But this exception 
is unlikely to change at any point in the near future, because, as 
mentioned in Section III, companies like Parabon have resolved 
unfinished police cases through law enforcement use of DNA. These 
recent successes are unlikely to alter the Alaskan legislature’s stance 
                                                 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 § 18.13.020. 
 122 Id. 
 123 § 18.13.030. 
 124 See Ave Mince-Didier, Alaska Misdemeanor Crimes by Class and 
Sentences, NOLO, https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/alaska-
misdemeanor-crimes-class-and-sentences.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 125 § 18.13.010. 
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on whether genetic privacy of an individual is protected when police 
collect a DNA sample for police purposes. 
The Alaskan genetic privacy statute also defines “DNA 
analysis” as “DNA or genetic typing and testing to determine the 
presence or absence of genetic characteristics in an individual.”126 It 
further defines a “genetic characteristic” as “a gene, chromosome, 
or alteration of a gene or chromosome that may be tested to 
determine the existence or risk of a disease, disorder, trait, 
propensity, or syndrome, or to identify an individual or a blood 
relative.”127 Ancestry does not necessarily test for the presence or 
absence of a risk for disease, disorder, trait, etc.128 It does, however, 
provide results about a consumer’s “genetic ethnicity estimates and 
. . . potential DNA matches, linking [the consumer] to others who 
have taken the AncestryDNA test.”129 These results are produced 
from Ancestry’s analysis of the consumer’s autosomal DNA, which 
includes almost all of the twenty-two pairs of non-sex 
chromosomes.130 Here, the definition of “DNA analysis” would 
bring Ancestry within the scope of the law because the company’s 
DTC genetic testing kit analyzes chromosomes to determine the 
existence of a certain trait (ethnicity, risk for disease, etc.) and to 
identify a potential relative. 
The Alaskan genetic privacy statute vests property rights in an 
individual to their own DNA sample and genetic information. The 
law also sets forth a civil and criminal penalty for anyone who 
misuses another’s DNA sample or genetic information. With the 
expansive definition of “DNA analysis” in the statute, Ancestry 
would be required to abide by the statute if it were in Alaska’s 
jurisdiction. This is an idealistic genetic privacy law upon which a 
new federal statute should be based in order to provide United States 
citizens with as much protection as possible from having their 
genetic information used against them. 
                                                 
 126 See § 18.13.100 (emphasis added). 
 127 Id. 
 128 See ANCESTRYDNA, ANCESTRYDNA 101: THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO DNA, 
supra note 8. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id. 
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2. New Mexico 
In 2015, New Mexico enacted its Genetic Information Privacy 
Act (“GIPA”).131 GIPA defines genetic information as “information 
about the genetic makeup of an individual or members of an 
individual’s family, including information resulting from genetic 
testing, genetic analysis, DNA composition, participation in genetic 
research or use of genetic services.”132 GIPA’s definition for 
“genetic analysis” includes chromosomal analysis, which tests for 
“a propensity for or susceptibility to illness, disease, impairment or 
other disorders.”133 
GIPA requires informed and written consent of an individual in 
order to collect, store, or disclose the individual’s genetic 
information.134 But GIPA also provides a laundry list of exceptions 
to this rule.135 The most interesting of these exceptions is one that 
                                                 
 131 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-1 (West 2019). 
 132 § 24-21-2. 
 133 Id. 
 134 § 24-1-3. 
 135 Id. Subsection (C), entitled “Genetic Analysis Prohibited without Informed 
Consent; Exceptions,” states:  
An individual’s DNA, genetic information or the results of genetic 
analysis may be obtained, retained, transmitted or used without the 
individual’s written and informed consent pursuant to federal or state law 
or regulations only: 
(1) to identify an individual in the course of a criminal investigation by 
a law enforcement agency; 
(2) if the individual has been convicted of a felony, for purposes of 
maintaining a DNA database for law enforcement purposes; 
(3) to identify a deceased individual; 
(4) to establish parental identity; 
(5) to screen newborns; 
(6) if the DNA, genetic information or results of genetic analysis are not 
identified with the individual or the individual’s family members; 
(7) by a court for determination of damage awards pursuant to the 
Genetic Information Privacy Act; 
(8) by medical repositories or registries; 
(9) for the purpose of medical or scientific research and education, 
including retention of gene products, genetic information or genetic 
analysis if the identity of the individual or the individual’s family 
members is not disclosed; 
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allows for the unauthorized use, storage, and disclosure of a person’s 
genetic information for the purpose of research and education.136 
GIPA requires that the identity of the individual or their family not 
be disclosed if their genetic information is used without 
authorization in this circumstance,137 but if someone still objects, 
there is an exception to the exception which prohibits that 
unauthorized use.138 An individual, or representative of that 
individual, is allowed to object on the basis of “religious tenets or 
practices” to any unauthorized collection, storage, disclosure, or use 
allowed under paragraphs 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of subsection (C).139 
GIPA also prohibits use of genetic information to discriminate in 
insurance, employment, housing, or lending situations.140 In 
addition, GIPA provides that no one shall retain another’s genetic 
information or DNA sample without first obtaining written consent 
from the individual.141 
There are established penalties for anyone who does not abide 
by GIPA, but the penalties are limited to civil actions.142 The 
attorney general, district attorney, or a person whose rights under 
GIPA were violated all have the ability to bring a civil action against 
a violator of GIPA.143 An injured individual is eligible to receive 
actual damages, attorney fees, court costs, and up to $5,000 of 
damages in addition to any economic loss if the violation was caused 
by willful or grossly negligent conduct.144 Each separate occurrence 
                                                 
(10) for the purpose of emergency medical treatment consistent with 
applicable law; or 
(11) by a laboratory conducting an analysis or test of a specified 
individual pursuant to a written order to the laboratory from a health care 
practitioner or the health care practitioner’s agent, including by 
electronic transmission. 
Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See id. 
 138 § 24-21-3. 
 139 See id. 
 140 § 24-21-4. 
 141 § 24-21-5. 
 142 § 24-21-6. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. 
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of wrongful collection, storage, disclosure, or use of genetic 
information is treated as an actionable violation of GIPA.145 
The New Mexico genetic privacy law is well-rounded, but does 
not protect the consumer of a DTC genetic testing kit from misuse 
as well as Alaska’s genetic privacy act. The scope of GIPA includes 
DTC genetic test kit companies like Ancestry because the statutory 
definitions of “genetic information” and “genetic analysis” include 
autosomal analyses and the results thereof, which Ancestry 
conducts. GIPA does offer individuals the right to retain their DNA 
and genetic information, but it does not classify either as the 
individual’s personal property.146 GIPA attempts to prohibit 
unauthorized collection, disclosure, and use of genetic information, 
but attaches a long list of exceptions to that rule.147 The Act offers a 
unique religious objection to unauthorized use of a person’s genetic 
data, but the statute never defines what qualifies as “religious tenets 
or practices.” It is unclear whether this religious exemption will be 
as low of a hurdle as some of the religious exemptions allowed by 
state vaccine laws, which are notorious for being exploited by non-
religious people.148 Further, GIPA does not include criminal 
penalties for violations, but the statute is proactive enough to 
distinguish that each instance of wrongful conduct is a separate and 
actionable violation of the law which can result in a civil penalty.149 
This could add up for a company such as Ancestry if there were a 
case of mass misuse of genetic information among the considerable 
amount of personal data they store. 
                                                 
 145 Id. 
 146 See § 24-21-3. 
 147 See id. 
 148 See Martha Quillin, Thousands of NC Students Aren’t Vaccinated – All 
Because of This Easy Exemption, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article188633004.html; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-157 (2018) 
(“If the bona fide religious beliefs of an adult or the parent, guardian or person in 
loco parentis of a child are contrary to the immunization requirements contained 
in this Chapter, the adult or the child shall be exempt from the requirements . . . 
[u]pon submission of a written statement . . . .”) 
 149 See § 24-21-6. 
294 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 20: 267 
3. Maryland 
In 1997, the legislature of Maryland passed the first draft of its 
only statute pertaining to genetic privacy, titled “Use of Genetic 
Tests to Affect Terms or Conditions of Health Insurance Policies or 
Contracts Prohibited.”150 The most recent version of this statute 
became effective in 2011 and remains narrow in scope of restrictions 
upon disclosure of genetic information.151 This statute consists of 
regulations in two subsections: (1) the use of genetic tests to affect 
terms or conditions of health insurance policies and (2) disclosure 
of identifiable genetic information to authorized employees or 
health care providers.152 The first subsection of the statute is prefaced 
with a statement that it does not apply to life insurance policies, 
annuity contracts, long-term care insurance policies, or disability 
insurance policies.153 Next is a statement that prohibits insurers, 
nonprofit health service plans, and health maintenance organizations 
from using genetic information to influence the terms, conditions, 
or price of a health policy or contract.154 This section also prohibits 
the release of genetic information without the concerned 
individual’s written consent.155 The second subsection of the statute 
                                                 
 150 MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (West 2019). 
 151 See id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. The full text of this subsection is as follows:  
An insurer, nonprofit health service plan, or health maintenance 
organization may not: 
(1) use a genetic test, the results of a genetic test, genetic information, or 
a request for genetic services, to reject, deny, limit, cancel, refuse to 
renew, increase the rates of, affect the terms or conditions of, or 
otherwise affect a health insurance policy or contract; 
(2) request or require a genetic test, the results of a genetic test, or genetic 
information for the purpose of determining whether or not to issue or 
renew health benefits coverage; or 
(3) release identifiable genetic information or the results of a genetic test 
to any person who is not an employee of the insurer, nonprofit health 
service plan, or health maintenance organization or a participating health 
care provider who provides medical services to insureds or enrollees 
without the prior written authorization of the individual from whom the 
test results or genetic information was obtained.  
Id. 
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limits disclosure of identifiable genetic information to an authorized 
employee or health care provider only to situations in which (1) a 
patient needs medical care, or (2) for the purpose of conducting 
legal, board-approved research.156 
The definitions in this statute are far more constricted than those 
of the Alaska statute.157 “Genetic information” is defined as 
information: 
1. about chromosomes, genes, gene products, or inherited characteristics 
that may derive from an individual or a family member; 2. obtained for 
diagnostic and therapeutic purposes; and 3. obtained at a time when the 
individual to whom the information relates is asymptomatic for the 
disease.158 
“Genetic information” does not include regular physical 
measurements; clinical analyses of blood, urine, or chemicals; drug 
tests; or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) tests.159 
Violation of the Maryland statute does not lead to any civil 
action or criminal penalty against an individual.160 But if a violator 
is an insurance company, they may receive a cease-and-desist order 
which commands the insurer to immediately shut down all insurance 
writing the company performs in the state of Maryland.161 As 
mentioned earlier, this Maryland statute does not place many limits 
on the collection, storage, or use of an individual’s genetic 
information.162 The purpose of the legislation was to regulate and 
prevent deceptive practices in the business of insurance.163 This was 
intended to keep insurance providers from benefitting through 
discriminatory methodologies such as fixing the policy rates at a 
higher price for someone who is moderately overweight and 
refusing to come down on the price until that person provides a 
                                                 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id.; see also § 4-114 (providing for issuance of a cease-and-desist order of 
anyone found in violation of the Maryland genetic privacy law). 
 162 See § 27-909. 
 163 See § 27-101. 
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genetic screening result that shows no genetic predisposition to 
diabetes. 
The statute could, however, give insurers flexibility to employ 
deceptive practices in making insurance transactions. For example, 
an insurance provider could discriminately request that a healthy 
man produce a genetic screen for any theoretical genetic 
susceptibility to one of the enumerated exclusions to “genetic 
information.”164 This deceptive practice could easily carry over to 
the DTC genetic testing industry under this statute because it 
provides for no regulation of collection, storage, or use of genetic 
information outside the realm of insurance practices. Under 
Maryland’s only genetic information privacy act, genealogy 
companies such as Ancestry are yet again left to regulate their own 
handling of consumer’s DNA. 
V.  THE VISION: A PROPOSITION TO PREVENT MISUSE OF DNA 
SAMPLES AND GENETIC INFORMATION 
A new, all-encompassing federal statute is necessary to bring 
DTC genetic test kit companies within the scope of uniform 
regulation. As laws across the United States currently stand, some 
states can regulate Ancestry’s actions with respect to genetic 
information, some states can only regulate genetic information in a 
health care and insurance context, and almost half of the states 
provide no guidance at all on a citizen’s genetic privacy rights. This 
incoherence amongst the states provides DTC genetic test kit 
companies an advantage over their consumers. The companies can 
implement choice-of-law clauses in their terms and conditions to 
preemptively apply law from a state with little or no regulation of 
genetic privacy.165 This in turn allows these companies broader 
collection, storage, disclosure, and use rights of consumers’ genetic 
information without fear of any liability. In fact, Ancestry has 
                                                 
 164 For purposes of this example, the genetic screen is testing for information 
not included within GINA’s definition of genetic information. 
 165 John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 
WASH. L. REV. 631, 634 (2017) (observing that sophisticated contracting parties, 
such as insurance companies, may research laws of multiple jurisdictions and 
draft a choice-of-law clause that incorporates the law most favorable to the 
sophisticated party). 
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specified Utah as the state law which governs all terms and uses of 
its service for consumers within the United States.166 Interestingly 
enough, Utah’s genetic privacy laws only prohibit the misuse of 
genetic information in employment and insurance contexts, leaving 
DTC genetic test kit companies unregulated.167 A federal law would 
provide uniformity in genetic privacy laws across the country and 
prevent DTC genetic test kit companies from forum-shopping for 
states that would provide little to no penalty at all for misuse of 
genetic information. 
This federal law must also effectively regulate DTC genetic test 
kit companies. An effective federal law would be one that is not too 
narrow in scope and regulates all of a person or entity’s interactions 
with another’s genetic information: collection, storage, and use. The 
scope of the law should not be confined to insurance providers for 
the purpose of defeating deceptive practices. The reach of the law 
should extend to any person, company, or government entity that 
has an initial interaction with a person’s genetic information outside 
of the ordinary course of medical interactions or law enforcement 
operations where acquisition of genetic information is routine. The 
effective law would not infringe on medical or law enforcement 
professionals’ ability to execute their ordinary business with DNA 
samples and genetic information they produce. But the law would 
prohibit those professionals, and any other person, from collecting, 
storing, or using DNA samples and genetic data that they did not 
produce—such as those found on genealogy sites, like Ancestry, or 
on compilation databases, like GEDmatch.168 
An effective federal law would prohibit the initial collection, 
continued storage, or prolonged use of a person’s genetic 
information without the concerned individual’s informed and 
written consent. In addition, it would vest personal property rights 
of DNA and DNA samples in the fabricator of said DNA or DNA 
sample. This would ensure a DTC genetic testing kit consumer has 
                                                 
 166 See Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRYDNA (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions. 
 167 See State Genetic Privacy Laws, supra note 109; see also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 26-45-101 to -106 (West 2019) (providing statutory penalties and civil rights 
of action for misuse of genetic information by only employers and insurers). 
 168 See Snow & Schuppe, supra note 51. 
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greater control over his own voluntarily-submitted sample, rather 
than just trusting the company will abide by their privacy policy and 
return the sample and other information when asked. In order to 
ensure DNA samples are returned to their rightful owners, the ideal 
law would provide a right of retention to the person from whom the 
DNA was produced. 
In the event a DTC genetic test kit company does misuse DNA 
samples or genetic information, a suitable federal law must also 
provide effective deterrence and discipline. Each individual instance 
of genetic information misuse should constitute a separate and 
actionable violation of the statute. Each violation of the statute 
should provide for both civil (money damages) and criminal (jail 
time and fine) liability. DNA samples and genetic information are 
highly valuable in today’s world; the law should treat them as such. 
Lastly, a desirable federal genetic information privacy act 
prohibits disclosure, acquisition, or use of a person’s genetic sample 
or information by law enforcement without the concerned 
individual’s informed consent. The interests of law enforcement 
must be balanced with the interests of the public, similar to the 
ideology behind the Maryland bill proposed by Charles Sydnor. Law 
enforcement has an interest in using all available resources that may 
lead to the identification and apprehension of criminals.169 The DTC 
genetic test kit users have an interest in maintaining the privacy of 
their genetic information. The United States’ Constitution grants  
citizens a right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well 
as protection from warrants issued without probable cause.170 The 
government should abide by that policy by further protecting its 
citizens’ genetic information from warrantless and unauthorized use 
by third parties. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While it is laudable that DTC genetic testing companies, such as 
Ancestry, are implementing privacy policies with self-imposed 
limitations on handling of consumers’ genetic information, it is 
important to remember that those companies are still businesses. 
                                                 
 169 See Watts, supra note 67. 
 170 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Businesses exist to make profit, and genetic information holds near 
infinite opportunity for profit.171 The need for a uniform, all-
encompassing federal law that regulates collection, storage, 
disclosure, and use of genetic information is mounting in urgency as 
DTC genetic testing kits rise in popularity. These genetic testing kit 
companies collect, store, and use Americans’ DNA without much 
federal oversight. A little over half of states have already recognized 
the threat to their citizens’ safety and enacted legislation towards 
limiting the manners in which a concerned individual’s DNA could 
be used against them. The potential for discrimination by an insurer, 
unauthorized distribution of a DNA sample, or unrestricted access 
to DNA by law enforcement exemplify the need for immediate 
implementation of an updated federal genetic information privacy 
act. Protection from discrimination alone through genetic 
information is no longer sufficient protection. 
The discrepancies between the three state statutes discussed in 
this article provide a sampling of the variance among all twenty-six 
current state laws concerning genetic information privacy. This lack 
of uniformity allows companies such as Ancestry to “shop” for a 
jurisdiction with more passive laws regarding the handling of 
genetic information, lessening the likelihood Ancestry could be 
found liable under any statute were the company to misuse genetic 
information. An effective federal law would create uniform law in 
all fifty states, preventing companies from forum-shopping for a 
way to legally exploit sensitive data. An effective federal genetic 
privacy law would deter, discipline, and hold DTC genetic test kit 
companies accountable for any misuse of consumers’ genetic 
material. 
 
                                                 
 171 See, e.g., Michael Grothaus, How 23andMe is Monetizing Your DNA, FAST 
CO. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3040356/what-23andme-is-
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